

The Thirtieth Annual
Virginia Model United Nations Conference
Presents...

IAEA Board of Governors

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Dear Delegates,

Welcomes to the International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors at the University of Virginia! We are so happy that you are able to join us at VAMUN XXX.

The topics for our committee this year are of international interest and should prove engaging and exciting for the delegations. The first topic area deals with the Islamic Republic of Iran, an oil-rich nation on the Persian Gulf claiming to be in pursuit of a peaceful nuclear program. However, many nations feel that the Iranians are secretly developing a nuclear weapons program. If this is true, then Iran will pose a major security threat to the Middle East and challenge the balance of power in the region. The second topic for discussion concerns the establishment of a Nuclear Weapons Free-Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. While NWFZs exist in many regions of the world, the zones only protect one third of the world's population. The establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East would expand these numbers and potentially bring more stability and cooperation to a volatile area. The IAEA Board of Governors will prioritize the issues at the start of the conference and will be expected to produce effective proposals before the delegations part ways.

On a more personal note, my name is Paul Hodskins and I am a third-year studying Foreign Affairs and Islam in the College. I hail from Leominster MA, a small city in North Central Massachusetts that calls itself the home of John "Appleseed" Chapman (yes, Johnny Appleseed was a real person). I attended St. John's High School in Shrewsbury MA, where I began Model United Nations and attended multiple conferences at Harvard and UChicago. I served as the moderator of our weekly meetings, a head delegate to our conferences and a mentor to new delegates. This will be my second year staffing VAMUN. Last year I was the crisis director for the Pakistani Cabinet, and this year I will be your chair in the IAEA.

Outside of IRO and Model UN, I serve as the Vice President of Membership and Scholarship for the Virginia Chapter of Delta Upsilon International Fraternity. I am also a member of FACE AIDS, a student campaign to fight AIDS in Africa, as well as a student advocate for Physicians for Human Rights. Additionally, I enjoy playing intramural sports as well as competing in collegiate paintball tournaments.

Please feel free to contact me at pmh3ca@virginia.edu if you have any questions about our committee or the conference. I hope that the IAEA will provide for an excellent experience at VAMUN XXX. I look forward to meeting you in November!

Best,
Paul M. Hodskins '12

Introduction

The International Atomic Energy Agency Board of Governors is composed of states that make recommendations to the IAEA General Conference. The Board, while responsible for oversight of accounts, programs, budget and membership, is most valued for its insight on safeguard agreements and safety standards. The Agency finds itself under great international pressure to make headway on the formulation of new countermeasure against the threat of nuclear terrorism. The Board has two highly sensitive topics to address, and it must do so in a decisive and effective manner. The first topic deals with the growing suspicion of the Iranian nuclear program. This is one of the world's most polarizing issues, provoking harsh rhetoric and heavy sanctions toward the Islamic Republic. President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad continues to insist that Iran solely seeks nuclear energy, something the Iranians have made a priority since the 1950s. However, some countries,

particularly the United States and Israel believe that Iran seeks to develop nuclear weapons. Iran denies such allegations, yet it remains suspiciously uncooperative when



asked to comply with inspections and transparency. Diplomatic efforts fail to be fruitful, and there are growing concerns about a hot conflict with Iran in the future.

The second topic deals with the establishment of a Nuclear Weapon Free-Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East. There are currently nine NWFZs in effect, including the seabed and space zones, which are respected by 115 states. Yet these zones fail to cover almost half of the world population and 40% of the Earth's land area. Member states of the United Nations have previously proposed a NWFZ for the Middle East; still they have failed to produce results. One of the main issues regarding the establishment of a Middle Eastern NWFZ lies with

Israel. On the record, Israel is not a nuclear weapon state (NWS); its government neither claims nor denies possession of nuclear weapons. Israel, however, is suspected to have had nuclear weapons since the late 1960s. The IAEA and Israel already have a tense relationship, and many of the Israeli hardliners and Zionists claim that the IAEA is sympathetic towards Arab states. If the Board is to propose the implementation of a NWFZ in the region, it is going to have to consider Israel's reaction.

The role of the IAEA continues to evolve with the changing global nuclear climate, yet its value has been called into question over the past years, especially in its dealings with Iran. As the Board tackles these topics, it must also consider the

future of the Agency and its strategies toward non-proliferation enforcement, nuclear technology, and energy development.

Brief History of the Committee

The IAEA was founded in 1957 in light of United States President Dwight Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" address in 1953, where he proposed that an international agency be created to monitor, safeguard, and share nuclear technology in a peaceful manner. The international community was well aware of the immense power of the nuclear bomb following WWII; the utter destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the bomb still resonates in the minds of the Japanese. Additionally, it was evident that other nations such as the USSR sought and developed nuclear weapons. Thus Eisenhower's ideas were put into effect under United Nations auspices, and the Agency was created with a mission focusing on three founding pillars: nuclear verification and security, safety and technological transfer.¹ The goal was to discourage the use of this newfound

¹ "History of the IAEA," adapted excerpt from History of the IAEA: First Forty Years by David Fisher, About IAEA, 2009, IAEA, 27 May 2010.
<<http://www.iaea.org/About/history.html>>

technology for military purposes yet promote cooperation in the exploration of nuclear energy. This new international body quickly found that it lacked the means to curb proliferation effectively as nations continued to pursue nuclear technology. Soon enough, France and China both became NWSs. The Agency needed more international support in order to fulfill its duties, and nations responded with a stronger international agreement. In 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature following a submission made by the Republic of Ireland. The NPT now serves as the backbone of the Agency and further defines its roles as the world's nuclear watchdog, aiming "to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to foster the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of disarmament."² This treaty, armed with better provisions for comprehensive safeguards, proved to be a much more effective way of

² "Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons NPT," International Conventions & Agreements, IAEA Publications, 2009, IAEA, 27 May 2010.

ensuring nuclear non-proliferation as a legally binding agreement between its signatories.

Following the implementation of the NPT, the world saw a new demand and enthusiasm for safe nuclear power. However, this enthusiasm declined following the meltdown at Chernobyl, a nuclear disaster which resulted in thousands of deaths and left over half a million people exposed when the fallout settled in Eastern Europe. The accident at Three Mile Island also contributed to the stagnation of the nuclear power industry. Nevertheless, the international community learned from the accidents and the IAEA quickly built upon its programs to ensure safety. By the mid 1990s, the Agency had helped to contain nuclear threats in Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, oversaw the establishment of NWFZs in Latin America, Southeast Asia and Africa, and saw the NPT along with a comprehensive test ban treaty made permanent by the UN General Assembly.³ The Agency, no longer

³ "History of the IAEA."

consumed with the nuclear arms race between the US and Soviet Union during the Cold War, could now develop a more balanced agenda focusing on both development-orientated projects, energy and weapons non-proliferation. However, the late 1990s and early 2000s forced the Agency and its partners to take on a new threat: nuclear terrorism. Standing by its founding pillars, the Agency now seeks to develop proactive countermeasures against the threats of nuclear terrorism while continuing to promote global development with nuclear energy.

Topic Area A: The Iranian Nuclear Program

Statement of the Problem

The Islamic Republic of Iran is not a new player in the nuclear arena. It has pursued nuclear energy and technology since the late 1950s. President Ahmadinejad insists that their ambitions are completely peaceful and that their nuclear program exists solely for the development of an alternative source

of energy. Yet why does an oil-rich nation like Iran, one that has yet to tap into the majority of the oil resources that exists in its territory, need the nuclear option? Iranian authorities deny all allegations that it is trying to produce a nuclear weapon, and US intelligence suggested that Iran halted any kind of weapons program in 2003. However, many skeptics remain. Iran isolated itself following the 2003 War



in Iraq and has been anything but compliant with UN and IAEA demands. It continues to face heavy sanctions from many nations, especially the US which labeled it a member of the “Axis of Evil” during George W. Bush’s presidency. President Obama shares the concerns of the Bush administration but has sought a diplomatic solution to the Iranian problem. Yet Iran’s behavior continues to suggest that it will remain uncooperative and, more

importantly, may be hiding something. The revelation of a new uranium enrichment facility at Qom alongside the February 2010 IAEA report about the status of Iran's program deepened suspicions. This new site at Qom is expected to house 3,000 centrifuges and is built within a mountain for its protection. According to the February report, Iran has "completed uranium enrichment to 20 percent and that the country continued nuclear weapons involvement beyond 2004."⁴ The report further states that "Iran has not provided the necessary cooperation to permit the Agency to confirm that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities...Iran is not implementing the requirements contained in the relevant resolution of the Board of Governors and the Security Council, including implementation of the Additional Protocol, which are essential to building confidence in the exclusively peaceful purpose of its

nuclear programme and to resolve outstanding questions."⁵

This alarming disclosure raised new questions and concerns from the international community, which now turns to the Agency for answers.

History and Capabilities of Iran's Program

Iran was once one of the primary beneficiaries of Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" program, receiving much external aid throughout the 1960s and 1970s as it established its own nuclear power program. Though an oil-rich country, Iran sought alternative forms of energy following some severe oil shocks and increasing threats of regional war. The US provided most of the technology and investment needed to jumpstart the Iranian program, agreeing for the US Atomic Energy Commission to lease low-enriched uranium (LEU) for research, a reactor, nuclear fuel and additional equipment. Iran also

⁴ "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, February 2010," *Essential Documents*, 18 February 2010, Council on Foreign Relations, 27 May 2010.
<<http://www.cfr.org/publication/21476>>

⁵ "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran, February 2010."

received assistance from France and Germany, allowing the construction of additional power stations and plants. In 1974, Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, further signaling his nation's commitment to nuclear energy.⁶ These events, along with Iran's signing of the NPT and completion of its Safeguard Agreement with the IAEA, confirmed the nation's commitment to nuclear energy.

Just a few years following the establishment of the AEO in Iran, the Shah found himself without his Western supporters. The US made a strategic decision to withdraw its support and pressured its allies to do the same. This resulted in the cancellation of major projects that would build at least four more reactors. US intelligence worried about the Shah's real ambitions following the successful nuclear test by India in 1974. It was also clear that there was more political unrest in

Tehran by the mid 1970s. In 1979, the Islamic Revolution took place; the Shah was expelled from Iran and Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile ready to establish his Shi'a-based theocracy. Diplomatic ties with the US and Israel were cut immediately, making these two previous allies sworn enemies of Iran. Following the US embassy hostage crisis, the US increased its opposition to Iran's nuclear program throughout the rest of the century, forcing Iran to be more discreet in its nuclear activities.

Iran's nuclear program suffered from its abandonment by Western partners coupled by the turmoil following the Islamic Revolution. The Iran-Iraq War stalled the program further, yet interest would be revitalized toward the end of the 1980s thanks to a partnership with Pakistan, a country suspected of giving the DPRK nuclear technology. During the 1990s, the Russian Federation signed a deal with Iran helping it to build light-water reactors as well as provide nuclear fuel. It is believed that China, Pakistan and North Korea may also provide future

⁶ Bruno, Greg, "Iran's Nuclear Program," *Backgrounder*, 10 March 2010, Council on Foreign Relations, 27 May 2010. <http://www.cfr.org/publication/16811/iran_s_nuclear_program.html>

assistance as Iran tries to “diversify its energy portfolio.”⁷

Today Iran has a sizeable network of facilities needed for a vast nuclear program, having at least a dozen major sites capable of allowing it to produce nuclear fuel on an industrial scale. Its nuclear power fuel cycle extends from uranium mining primarily at Saghand AdakanGchine, milling and processing, to conversion into uranium hexafluoride, to enrichment and fuel fabrication at Natanz. and Esfahan. The site at Natanz is one of the largest, containing two primary facilities, the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) and the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP), as well as 4,000 centrifuges and advanced testing areas.⁸ Natanz serves as the central step in the nuclear power fuel cycle in Iran, enriching the uranium before it is sent to the facilities in Esfahan for fuel fabrication. The fuel is then processed at the light-water reactor facility in Bushehr, which then produces electric power and nuclear


waste. This current process does not yield the proper isotope for weapons-grade uranium. As of now, there is no way of truly knowing whether or not Iran is capable of producing weapons-grade uranium or separation weapons-grade plutonium to put into a nuclear arsenal.

The newly revealed site at Qom remains a mystery to the outside world. The site is too small to make a beneficial commercial contribution, yet it is just the right size to generate enough weapons-grade uranium for a warhead. Furthermore, the Qom facility is built to thwart an aerial attack; the fact that much of the facility is protected within a mountain and is located next to a Revolutionary Guard base raises suspicion. Another questionable move by Iran was the installation of a heavy-water reactor at Arak, a facility normally necessary


⁷ Bruno, Greg, “Iran’s Nuclear Program.”

⁸ “Natanz,” Nuclear Sites, 19 May 2010, ISIS NuclearIran - Institute for Science and International Security , 27 May 2010.
<<http://www.isisnucleariran.org/sites/facilities/fuel-enrichment-plant/>>

Iran's Enrichment Program



Process Necessary for Weapons Production



for separation plutonium in the spent fuel. A heavy-water reactor is needed to yield weapons-grade plutonium and therefore raises more proliferation concerns. The Agency has yet to inspect the heavy-water reactor as well as test the heavy water itself. Iran claims to have produced the heavy water on its own, but it has not revealed exactly how much it possesses.

While Iran may have an “inalienable right” to nuclear energy under the terms of the NPT, it does not have a right to develop and possess nuclear weapons. The fact that the Islamic Republic has not cooperate with the Agency on many issues makes it impossible to exclude possibilities of there being military dimensions to the nuclear program. The Board of Governors has already expressed an “absence of confidence” in Iran’s nuclear ambitions and has referred Iran to the UN Security Council. Throughout the past decade, more nations have become wary of Iran and carried out aggressive sanctions against Iranian businesses,

banks and individuals. However, this appears to only strain relations with Iran even further, possibly encouraging its defiance and secrecy. The Agency must do something to make more positive inroads in its relationship with Iran if its resolutions are to be respected and upheld.

Primary Concerns

The international community appears to be running out of options for dealing with the recalcitrant Islamic Republic. Sanctions seem to be the only non-military resource that nations have to challenge the theocracy, and yet Iran continues on with its program with few roadblocks. The US, after having many of its talks fall through, seeks to place more draconian sanctions on Iran. However, members of the UN Security Council are growing weary of such talks, particularly Russia and China who do not want to see a fourth round of UN sanctions. There is a general concern that there is not an overall strategy to deal with a nuclear Iran.

Additionally, some believe that many nations, including the US, would not be able to counter Iran in an effective manner. Some Washington hawks demand that the US have a credible military option if Iran crosses the line. Yet what exactly constitutes the line? Is it the continued enrichment of uranium and expansion of the Natanz facility? Is it the expansion of Iran's heavy-water reactor program? Or is it the revelation that Iran possesses nuclear weapons? These questions need to be answered.

Iran may seek nuclear weapons for deterrence, prestige or the coercion of non-nuclear states in the Middle East. Despite their being predominantly Muslim, Iranians feel threatened by their Sunni neighbors and the Israelis. The Iranians had legitimate concerns during the 1990s following the Iran-Iraq War when Saddam Hussein stepped up his nuclear weapons program. Iran had already suffered heavy losses during the way, many of them due to Saddam's ruthless use of chemical warfare. The fear of nuclear proliferation, however, did not begin

with Iraq. Many suspect Israel of being a NWS since the late 1960s, which raises another important question: is nuclear deterrence a viable option in the Middle East? Israel's policies did not deter aggression or prevent wars. This is evident when considering the Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973. Egypt and Syria deliberately went to war with a (likely) nuclear Israel in an attempt to take back Gaza and the Golan Heights, respectively.

However, the Arab states never did attack Israel proper, suggesting that Israel's policy of opacity in regards to its nuclear potential has some deterrence value.

Many wonder who would respond militarily to a nuclear Iran. Israel feels most threatened by the Islamic Republic seeing that Iran seeks to "wipe Israel off of the map," a comment made by Ahmadinejad in 2005.⁹ It has shown signs that it may be the first to act, having already conducted military exercises related

⁹ Fathi, Nazila, "Wipe Israel 'off the map' Iran says," World News, 27 October 2005, The New York Times, 28 May 2010.
<<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/26/world/africa/26iht-iran.html>>

to a campaign against Iran. It is important to note that Israel destroyed the nuclear site Osirak in Iraq and conducted a unilateral operation destroyed a Syrian nuclear cache. Thus Israel may consider similar operation with Iran. However, it was much easier for Israel to reach Syria and Iraq when compared to the long flight to Iran. Furthermore, Israel would need to work with Arab nations in order to pass through their airspace.

The US remains among the most concerned with Iran's nuclear ambitions as well, yet it may not be able to respond militarily in an effective manner. The War in Iraq and the War on Terror have shown the world the limitations and weaknesses of the US military. If the US did decide to attack Iran, it would face a much stronger opponent in the Revolutionary Guard when compared to Iraqi forces. Yet the US is already tied down in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan. It cannot afford to wage a war with Iran, especially not if it is to do so singlehandedly. The new US National Security Strategy provides a clear and effective framework for

dealing with Al-Qaeda and further defines US policy towards Iran, claiming that it "will pursue multiple means to increase their isolation and bring them into compliance with international nonproliferation norms."¹⁰ Yet as the international community has seen, such policies have done little to deter Iran.

Another concerned state is Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has very poor relations with Iran and does not want a Persian Gulf nation to develop nuclear weapons. Furthermore, the Kingdom does not want to have to worry about both an Israeli and Persian threat; while Saudi Arabia is oil-rich it is weak militarily and cannot ward off multiple enemies. Rumors have it that Saudi Arabia sought to establish a nuclear weapons program of its own, but none of the allegations are supported by facts at this time. It is believed, however, that Saudi Arabia may have provided funding to both Pakistan and Iraq for

¹⁰ "National Security Strategy," National Security Council, 27 May 2010, The White House, 28 May 2010.
<www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf>

their nuclear programs as a countermeasure against Israel following the 1973 war.

If Iran were to develop nuclear weapons or even signal their capability to do so, the Islamic Republic would challenge the balanced of power in the middle East a pose a potential threat to its neighbors and others in the international community. Since Israel has not confirmed its possession of nuclear weapons, there is no nuclear power in the Middle East at the time. There is arguably no regional hegemon either. Thus Iran may be seeking to become the dominant state in region by having a nuclear arsenal at is disposal. Some claim that Iran might even pass nuclear secrets, material or even weapons to terrorists groups, citing Iran's sympathies towards organizations like Hezbollah and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), but such allegation are unfounded and are simply speculative. More importantly, though, Iranian acquisition of nuclear weapons could cause a domino of proliferation in the region, ultimately undermining the Agency's work and rendering it

irrelevant. It is therefore imperative that the Board comes up with a comprehensive resolution dealing with Iran before they no longer have a say in the outcome of the situation.

Relevant UN and IAEA Action

As stated previously, both the UN Security Council and the IAEA have produced resolutions regarding the state of Iran's program and requests for cooperation. The first of the modern reports were produced by the Agency in 2003, with the most recent one made available on February 18, 2010 (you can access all of the reports here [INSERT HYPERLINK](#)). This report highlights the Agency's discoveries, where and how Iran has been cooperative, where Iran continues to fail to live up to its obligations and current requests. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon recently called on Iran to do more to dispel international suspicion. Russia has shown support for a new round of sanctions as it becomes evident that Moscow and Tehran are at odds. President Ahmadinejad has accused Russia of "bowing to US pressure," to

which the Kremlin countered by stating that Ahmadinejad engages in “political demagoguery.”¹¹ It is clear that Russia is getting annoyed with Iran’s behavior and is changing its policy toward Iran’s expanding nuclear program.

Proposed Solutions

The Board of Governors finds itself under much pressure to produce an effective resolution addressing the Iranian nuclear program. The Islamic Republic routinely ignores bilateral and multilateral agreements concerning its program and failure to live up to its obligations under various international protocols. One solution for the committee would be to rely on current agreements and work to strengthen said agreements. This would require a reevaluation of the policies regarding enforcement of these agreements and possible methods for extending incentives for Iran’s cooperation. The Iranian

economy continues to suffer, and if the Agency could suggest programs that would aid in Iran’s development, Iran may be more cooperative.

Another solution may be to nullify previous agreements with Iran and come up with new contracts.

Additionally, the Agency could decide on total detachment from the issue and let nations act on their own.

However, the Agency may come under further scrutiny for such a decision.

These options are merely suggestions. The Board will have to come up with a comprehensive strategy that they believe will be best for the Agency to implement. Each delegation must be prepared for extensive discussion.

Notable Positions

United States of America

The United States serves as one of the leaders of the opposition to Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Allying itself with the Iranian opponents to President Ahmadinejad’s hard-line government, the US calls for regime change within Iran and the

¹¹ Benson, Todd and Brian Ellsworth, “U.N.’s Ban urges Iran talks with security council,” 27 May 2010, Reuters, 28 May 2010
<<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE64Q48L20100527>>

establishment of a democratic state. Washington has lot much of its faith in the UN Security Council to make inroads in the issue. However, the US is not ready to tackle this issue unilaterally and considers military intervention a last resort. President Obama seeks to gain more support from US allies and establish a coalition that will deter and contain Iran.

Israel

Israel is arguably the staunchest opponent to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. At the same time, many consider Israel's weapons policy to be helping Iran: if Israel is allowed to have a policy of opacity, then why cannot Iran do the same? Israel admits to carrying out simulation exercises, both military and political, concerning the Iranian issue. Based on its past actions, Israel may be the first to take preventative action against Iran.

Russian Federation

Originally holding a controversial stance regarding Iran's nuclear ambitions, Russia has grown tired of an uncooperative Iran and has

shown more support for UN sanctions. President Dmitry Medvedev made it clear that relations with the US are more important than those with Iran, therefore suggesting that Russia will avoid a policy toward Iran that may strain US-Russia relations. Russia, however, will

continue its work on the Bushehr nuclear power plant, a \$1 billion project on the Persian Gulf. Russia may also continue to deliver sophisticated arms to the Islamic Republic, which includes anti-aircraft systems.¹² Moscow has reminded the international community that it has a right to make deals in foreign markets as a responsible seller yet is not interested in the further militarization of the Middle East.

People's Republic of China

Though China is one of the main trading partners of Iran, it was one of the nations that alerted the UN Security Council to Iran's nuclear

¹² Weird, Fred, "Russia: sanctions unlikely to delay Iran nuclear power plant," 21 May 2010. Christian Science Monitor, 1 June 2010. <<http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2010/0521/Russia-sanctions-unlikely-to-delay-Iran-nuclear-power-plant>>

program, releasing intelligence to UN officials back in 2008.¹³ China seeks a stable international environment to maintain and advance its economic interests. That said, it does not want a nuclear Iran interfering with its domestic development or cause a domino effect of proliferation in the Middle East, something that may affect Chinese energy exports from Saudi Arabia.

Republic of India

India, like China and Russia, support Iran's nuclear program, yet it is critical of Iran's uncooperative nature and failure to adhere to IAEA protocols. However, India has made it clear that it will not support any threats of violence made towards Iran for its nuclear program. At the same time, India says that Iran must take steps to restore trust. India believes that the Iranian issue can be handled in a peaceful manner.

The Arab States

The Arab states find themselves in an unofficial alliance with Israel against Iran. Arab leaders decry the Iranian nuclear program and fear the concept of an Iranian nuclear arsenal. This would upset the balance of power in the region and allow the Islamic Republic to bully other states, particularly those in the Persian Gulf as it seeks to advance its economic and strategic interests.

Suggestions for Research

Seeing that this is a hot topic in international debate, there should not be a problem finding literature on the Iranian nuclear issue. A basic knowledge of Middle Eastern history would prove beneficial. Delegates should turn to the IAEA website in order to understand the Agency's mission as well as its current and past actions. Additionally, the International Crisis Group may have valuable information and serve as a launching pad for research. Be sure to use all the resources that are available to you so that you come prepared to contribute.

¹³ Freeman, Charles, "The China Factor in Iran's Nuclear Strategy," 8 Jan. 2010, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1 June 2010. <<http://csis.org/publication/china-factor-irans-nuclear-strategy>>

Topic Area B: The Establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East

Statement of the Problem

One of the greatest threats to the Middle East is the acquisition of nuclear weapons by dangerous third parties such as terrorist organizations. The creation of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East could strengthen regional security and prevent a possible outbreak of nuclear war in the future. Religion, politics and deep-rooted feuds could prove devastatingly lethal when mixed with nuclear weapons. The establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East could help to prevent any irreversible ramifications.

During its thirtieth session on December 11, 1975, the UN General Assembly promoted NWFZs, stating, "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones constitute one of the most effective means for preventing the proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, of nuclear weapons and for contributing to the elimination of the

danger of a nuclear holocaust."¹⁴ The terms horizontal and vertical refer to proliferation between nations (horizontal) and proliferation by a single nation (vertical). Today, the Antarctic territories, Latin America and the Caribbean, Africa, the South Pacific, and Central Asia are recognized NWFZs. The creation of a NWFZ may be the only way to secure a lasting peace in an extremely sensitive region like the Middle East.

History of the Problem

At the outbreak of the Cold War, the Middle East imported a vast amount of nuclear technology from both the United States and the USSR. Most of the material and technology were sent in order to create plants and reactors for peaceful purposes. Client states, however, began to take on different agendas. By the 1970s, Israel and South Africa developed nuclear weapons, but South Africa disposed of theirs in the Treaty of

¹⁴ United Nations General Assembly resolution 3472 B (XXX), 11 December 1975, United Nations, 1 June 2010. <<http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/4699.htm>>

Pelindaba.¹⁵ By the 1990s, Egypt, Libya and Iran developed nuclear technologies. This occurred because there was no check on the use of nuclear power in the region by nations exporting the needed technology and material. Attempts at past agreements included the Arab League, Israel, Iran and Turkey, but none of them produced lasting arrangements.

As the leader in nuclear technology in the region (mainly through the help of France and the US after World War II), Israel has annually produced 30 kilograms of weapons grade plutonium at the Dimona complex. At this rate, it is possible that Israel possesses hundreds of nuclear weapons.¹⁶ There is no evidence, however, that Israel has ever conducted a nuclear test, as it is a member of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space,

and Under Water. As of now, it is possible that Israel's nuclear weapons could be used as a deterrent to neighboring Arab nations that threaten its existence. Yet Israel's nuclear capabilities have been the reason for the refusal of political and territorial concessions by these states, rather than deterring attacks or promoting diplomacy.

Israel also refused to sign the NPT due to the fact that the treaty does not provide "adequate" security guarantees. Israel has a tense history with the Agency as well, believing that the IAEA has "sympathies to the Arab world." Israel defends its movement as a security precaution in response to the determination of Arab state to produce nuclear weapons of their own. It rejected talks for a meeting in 2012 to discuss a nuclear-arms-free Middle East despite overwhelming support for the plan by other UN nations.¹⁷ Arab states and Iran, however, declare that they seek

¹⁵ "Treaty of Pelindaba," 11 April 1996, Department of Foreign Affairs, Republic of South Africa, 1 June 2010.

<<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4699.htm>>

¹⁶ Aftergood, Steven and Hans M. Kristensen, 8 Jan. 2007, Federation of American Scientists, 1 June 2010.

<<http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/>>

¹⁷ "Israel rejects Middle East nuclear talks plan," 29 May 2010, BBC World News, 1 June 2010.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/middle_east/10191339.stm>

peaceful nuclear programs and hope that Israel will sign the NPT.

Primary Concerns

Aside from the Iranian dilemma, the most pressing issue related to the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East is the status of loose nuclear weapons in former Soviet satellite states. Many in the international community continue to turn a blind eye to this longstanding issue even though the potential for theft and nuclear terrorism remain real. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) suddenly found itself in possession of many Cold War era nuclear warheads and large amounts of nuclear material. Over the past two decades, the Russian Federation has made strong efforts to secure this material.

Nevertheless it is believed that there is still more material unaccounted for. There are numerous instances of theft of Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from Russia and the former satellite states, most of them occurring in the early 1990s before

any major measures were taken by the international community. In 1992, around 1.5 kilograms of 90% enriched HEU was stolen from the Luch production facility in Podolsk, Russia.¹⁸ In 1993, nearly 1.8 kilograms of 30% enriched HEU was stolen from a naval base.¹⁹ Other instances of theft suggest that some groups may have stolen enough material to construct an atomic bomb. Much of the theft can be blamed on Russia's failure to properly secure the material. Reports reveal that soldiers did not even have the means to properly protect the facilities. Some facilities were even abandoned. This issue has since been addressed by the Russian Federation and the United States. However, some fear that the material may already be in the wrong hands.

The acquisition of nuclear technology by a terrorist organization may be the greatest potential threat to the safety and stability of the Middle

¹⁸ Stern, Jessica. *The Ultimate Terrorists*, Harvard University Press: 2001. p.98.


¹⁹ Gopal S., "Nuclear Terrorism: Relevance and Prospects in South Asia," Noida, India: South Asia Analysis Group, October 2001. <<http://www.saag.org/papers4/paper359.html>>

East. This is entirely possible due to the close relations between some Middle Eastern governments and terrorist cells, whether it is through direct monetary backing or moral support. Al Qaeda, Hezbollah and the

PLO continue to pose a threat to the region. If any nuclear technology or material fell into their hands, the threat may drastically affect international security.

NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE AREAS

Demarcation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, nuclear-weapon-free status and nuclear-weapon-free geographical regions



TREATIES ESTABLISHING NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE AREAS

Nuclear-weapon-free zones

- ① The 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
- ② The 1985 South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty
- ③ The 1995 Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone
- ④ The 1996 African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
- ⑤ The 2006 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

The treaties establishing the nuclear-weapon-free-zones, inter alia, ban nuclear weapons within the respective territories of the zones, including the acquisition, possession, placement, testing and use of such weapons.

Nuclear-weapon-free status



- ⑥ In 1992, Mongolia declared its nuclear-weapon-free status, which is internationally recognized and prohibits, inter alia, the acquisition, possession, placement, testing and use of nuclear weapons on its territory.

Nuclear-weapon-free geographical regions

- ⑦ The 1959 Antarctic Treaty, inter alia, prohibits any measures of military nature on the continent of Antarctica, including any testing of nuclear weapons.
- ⑧ The 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, inter alia, prohibits placing nuclear weapons in orbit around Earth, installing or testing these weapons on the Moon and other celestial bodies as well as stationing these weapons in outer space in any other manner.

- ⑨ The 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, inter alia, prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons on the bottom of the ocean and in the subsoil thereof.

As of 2007, the above nine treaties are at different stages with regard to their signature, ratification and entry into force, as well as with regard to the signature and ratification of their attached protocols requesting assurances from the nuclear-weapon States.



Relevant Past Actions and Events

United Nations Resolution 3472

This UN resolution was adopted on January 21, 1976 by the General Assembly, declaring a NWFZ to include “the total absence of nuclear weapons” and a system of “verification and control to guarantee compliance with the obligations deriving from that statute.”²⁰

1974 Draft Resolution

The Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) presented the first draft for a NWFZ in the Middle East. The draft included the idea of an international safeguard system. Because of Israel’s abstention, the draft fell through.

2003 Invasion of Iraq

The Coalition Forces, led by the United States, invaded Iraq on the premise that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Since the invasion, no WMD have been

confiscated in Iraq, yet the dictator has been tried and hanged for past war crimes.

October 26, 2005 General Assembly Draft Texts

On this date, the General Assembly adopted 21 draft texts dealing with NWFZS, stressing the importance of the establishment of a NWFZ in the Middle East. Many member nations called for international pressure on Israel to sign the NPT and accept the establishment of a NWFZ.

Proposed Solutions

In order for a NWFZ to be established, a commitment is needed by member states not to manufacture nuclear weapons or devices in or for Middle Eastern nations. Since there are nations pursuing nuclear technology for the development of nuclear energy, this could be included in a resolution. Religion and terrorism could potentially cause debate, as they are a source of conflict in the region.

The Agency’s protocols alongside NPT protocols must be adhered to and

²⁰ “Definitions and Characteristics of a NWFZ,” 2005, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 1 June 2010. <http://www.nti.org/h_learnmore/nwftutorial/chapter02_01.html>

addressed in any resolution while respecting the opinions of Middle Eastern states. A new resolution would be fairly flexible as it would be comprised of old and new conditions regarding a NWFZ yet specifically address the demands and ramifications concerning those directly affected by the NWFZ. While the nations represented in the Board of Governors may agree to such a proposal, there will need to be a greater discussion and signatory process through the UN and some sort of Middle Eastern summit.

Notable Positions

United States of America

The United States would stand against the formation of a NWFZ in the Middle East. In the past, the US has repeatedly voted against limits on nuclear weapons in different places around the world, including the Middle East. For example, the US was one of only four countries to have voted against a draft resolution entitled “Establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia”

when it was proposed in October 2006. The US also voted against draft resolutions on the establishment of a NWFZ in the southern hemisphere and the Middle East in past years.²¹ The US would most likely opt for resolutions that would keep the Middle East from going nuclear, but at the same time, not lock out the possibility of being able to supply or launch a nuclear warhead in the Middle East during a time of crisis. Furthermore, the US argues that a NWFZ would be an infringement on a nation’s sovereignty, particularly that of Israel. “We strongly oppose efforts to single out Israel, and will oppose actions that jeopardize Israel’s national security,” said President Obama following Israel’s decision not to participate in the 2010 UN meeting regarding a nuclear-arms-free Middle East.²²

²¹ “United Nations General Assembly Official Records: A/C.1/61/PV.23,” 19 Sept. 2007. <[http://disarmament.un.org/library.nsf/d0ca5f229462d61c852572ab006df5d3/706a1a8e524ad77852572ab006d68ae/\\$FILE/a-62-100-add1.pdf](http://disarmament.un.org/library.nsf/d0ca5f229462d61c852572ab006df5d3/706a1a8e524ad77852572ab006d68ae/$FILE/a-62-100-add1.pdf)>

²² “Israel rejects Middle East nuclear talks plan.” <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/middle_east/10191339.stm>

Israel

Israel, closely allied with the US, would be against a traditional NWFZ. Currently Israel is not considered a NWS due to its policy of opacity. Israel worries that should Iran acquire nuclear weapons, a traditional NWFZ would inhibit the ability of the US to supply Israel with weapons to protect itself or deter an attack. Israel has voted against many resolutions regarding a NWFZ in the Middle East, claiming that all have been too one-sided, targeting Israel over Arab nations. Israel feels that all discussions single it out rather than addressing other nuclear questions, such as those concerning Pakistan and India.

United Kingdom

The UK has traditionally followed the policy of the US in regards to the establishment of a Middle Eastern NWFZ. As a NWS, the UK may not be in favor of all NWFZs, however, they would be much more willing than the US to encourage Middle Eastern nations to agree to one. The UK would most likely support a resolution for a NWFZ so

long as it encourage transparency and affected all parties evenly.


Pro-NWFZ States

Countries including, but not limited to, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Syria, Mongolia, most South American countries, most African countries, most Southeast Asian countries and most South Pacific countries would be in favor of a NWFZ in the Middle East. Most of them are already part of a NWFZ, such as the one formed by the Rarotonga Treaty in the South Pacific, the Pelindaba Treaty in Africa, the Treaty of Tlatelolco in South America, or the Bangkok Treaty in Southeast Asia. These countries feel that a NWFZ in a highly unstable region like the Middle East would ensure a safer world for all. The Middle Eastern countries in this bloc feel that a NWFZ may be the only way to ensure a nuclear weapon-free region with the ongoing advances in Israeli and Iranian nuclear technologies.

Anti-NWFZ States

Countries including, but not limited to, Iran, Israel, the United

States, India, Pakistan, Australia and China would be against a NWFZ. However, this would vary from case to case. In the past, all of these countries have voted against some sort of resolution proposing a NWFZ for the Middle East.²³ Again, it depends on the specifics of the resolution and its effects on the region as well as the world. For example, a country such as Australia would normally be for a NWFZ in the Middle East, however the nation has repeatedly voted against it because they felt that these resolutions unfairly targeted Israel.²⁴



²³ "United Nations General Assembly Official Records: A/C.1/61/PV.23"

²⁴ Acheson, Eric, "Nuclear Weapon Free Zones," 27 Oct. 2006, Reaching Critical Will, 1 June 2010.
<<http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/FCM06/week4.html#9>>

